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Maintaining Sovereignty in Africa: 
The Role of External Forces in Warlord States 
Max Halupka 




The article presents an analysis of the role that external forces play in the 
maintenance of sovereignty in Warlord states. We focus on the strategies 
enacted by various warlords in Africa, specifically in Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. Latham’s concept of 
‘transterritorial deployments’ underpins the article’s analysis of African 
state sovereignty, leading us to argue that in order to maintain 
sovereignty, rulers of warlord states come to rely upon forms of 
transterritorial deployment. In this, sovereignty is maintained through a 
combination of three processes: the auctioning off of state resources, the 
employment of external actors to fill state roles, and the development of 
foreign patrimonial networks. This argument provides important insight 
into local/global interactions and the manner in which they affect 
perceptions of sovereignty. Moreover, the article highlights the roles that 
external entities can enact in shaping forms of authority and governance 
in Africa. 
Introduction  
For a ruler of a warlord state, sovereignty is a powerful commodity. It 
permits an unparalleled level of manoeuvrability in the procurement of 
personal wealth and allows a ruler to “... manipulate [the] enforcement of 
laws, to generate globally accepted documents, and to hide clandestine 
activity behind diplomatic immunity.”1 In states where personal interest 
dominates decision making, maintaining sovereign status is of paramount 
importance. In this article we present an analysis of the role of external 
forces in the maintenance of state sovereignty, focusing predominantly on 
several strategies enacted by various warlords in Africa, specifically in 
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia. To 
demonstrate the necessity of external actors in the legitimisation of a 
ruler’s authoritative position, we draw upon Latham’s concept of 
‘transterritorial deployments,’ arguing that in order to maintain 
1 William Reno,Warlord Politics and African States.(London: Lynne Rienner, 1998),2 
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sovereignty, rulers of warlord states come to rely upon judicial forms of 
transterritorial deployment.2  
 
The argument is composed of three main strands. First, to clarify the role 
of external forces in the degradation of a state, we differentiate weak state 
politics from warlord politics. Fundamentally, such differentiation is best 
understood in terms of the ruler or ruling body’s position on the state’s 
economic responsibility: should the state utilise its resources for 
collective benefit, or private gain? Also of relevance here is Robert 
Jackson’s concept of the ‘quasi-state,’ a term used to denote the reliance 
of a state on foreign aid to compensate for its internal weakness.3 Second, 
we introduce the concept of ‘transboundary formations’—the intersection 
between state and non-state entities within the territorial boundaries of the 
state itself. The notion of transterritorial deployments will also be 
discussed. Conceived as a dimension or element of transboundary 
formations, these deployments represent the physical presence of external 
forces in the state setting. Finally, we highlight significant aspects 
relating to the concept of sovereignty. Central to this is the identification 
of reciprocal recognition of a state’s sovereign status. In a mutually 
beneficial practice, instances of legitimate international relations are 
facilitated by a shared recognition of autonomy. It is from this basis that 
the article argues that rulers of warlord states maintain sovereignty 
through a combination of three processes: the auctioning off of state 
resources, the employment of external actors to fill state roles, and the 
development of foreign patrimonial networks.   
 
Weak, Warlord and Quasi-States 
Central to our analysis of sovereignty is the differentiation of weak state 
politics from warlord politics. This allows for the critical observation of 
the contribution on non-state forces to the adoption of warlord tactics, 
often in an attempt to delay state failure. It also enables a more thorough 
assessment of the context of the African political landscape. Weak states 
exhibit many of the characteristics associated with failed states, such as: 
an unstable political/social/economic environment, an inability to 
maintain legitimacy, a reliance on patrimonial networks, and a collapse of 
                                                 
2 Robert Latham, “Identifying the contours of transboundary political life,” in 
Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power, ed. 
Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
3 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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the state bureaucracy.4 Jean-Francois Bayart’s notion of ‘elite 
accommodation’ provides a crucial insight into weak state policies.5 
Bayart suggests that in order to exercise a significant level of sovereignty 
within weak states, rulers often develop informal deals with individuals 
who occupy relevant positions of power.6 Using the term ‘shadow state,’ 
Reno likens elite accommodation to neo-patrimonial forms of governance 
in that there exists a localisation of power within a specific individual, 
rather than a legal institution or representing party.7 Weak states often 
come to rely on such patrimonial systems in order to bind “potential 
rivals to them in exchange for largesse without the need to create strong 
bureaucracies [which they fear] would heighten independent tendencies 
among elites.”8 An over reliance on maintaining patrimonial networks in 
an attempt to stabilise authority, however, results in the inability of the 
state to provide basic public services. This concept is central to Joel 
Migdal’s “politics of survival,” wherein the pursuit of authoritative 
security undermines economic development.9 The state may view itself as 
acting in the collective interest by maintaining authoritative control, but 
its inability to meet the needs of its population undermines its internal 
sense of legitimacy. Filling the roles left in the wake of the state’s 
inability are local strongmen, individuals whose “broader interests run 
counter to those of the ruler.”10 Due to this reliance on patrimonial 
systems—which isolate the working class—when challenged by such 
strongmen, weak state rulers lack the internal legitimacy to mobilise 
popular support.  
 
In addition, weak states face acute problems from creditors who demand 
policy change and reform in exchange for much-needed financial 
backing. For instance, the World Bank lends to all but one of Africa’s 47 
                                                 
4 Thomas M. Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt 
Regime,” in Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of 
Power, ed. Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); William Zartman. ed. Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), 9-10. 
5 Jean-Francois Bayart, L'etat en Afrique: Politique du Ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 
150ff. 
6 Bayart, L'etat en Afrique: Politique du Ventre, 207-227.  
7 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 2-3. 
8 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 2. 
9 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988) 206-236. 
10 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 4. 
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sub-Saharan states.11 In borrowing from the World Bank, each state must 
recognise the Bank’s advice on reform, which emphasises abandoning 
patrimonial networks.12 In responding to the call for economic and 
political liberalisation, however, rulers run the risk of isolating their 
patrimonial networks, and thus derailing their internal authoritative 
position.13 Similarly, any reform that emphasises liberalisation through 
the creation of strong bureaucratic systems provides an opportunity for 
the elite to challenge state power.14 Weak states rely heavily on both the 
accommodation of the elite and the backing of creditors to stave off 
threats to state survival. Each of these components plays a significant role 
in the maintenance of authoritative sovereignty. Yet paradoxically, both 
cannot exist harmoniously if the state works towards the collective 
interest. External pressure for greater levels of liberalisation, deriving 
from non-state creditors, seems to call for the dismantling of established 
patrimonial networks in favour of regimented bureaucratic institutions. 
These networks, however, facilitate the ability of a ruler to exercise state 
autonomy in that they stave off internal power struggles. As such, weak 
states may seek to adopt warlord strategies that allow them greater 
manoeuvrability in terms of the manipulation of state resources. 
 
As a weak state slips towards failure, it may adopt warlord strategies to 
delay its decline; a strategy of state survival. The primary difference 
between weak state politics and warlord politics is the contrasting focus 
of collective versus private interest.15 Within weak states, the pursuit of 
authoritative power is still theoretically acting to further the collective 
good; maintaining state authority is considered the best possible scenario 
for state survival. This is often regardless of any focus on 
neopatrimonialism, the politics of survival, and the disregard of the 
working class. Conversely, warlord politics entail an absolute focus on 
the individual ruler, who adopts strategies that contribute to prolonging 
his/her position of personal interest, pursuing power through purely 
                                                 
11 Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1: 2004: 117-240. 
12 Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa,” 115-116; The World Bank, 
Ajustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead, Volume 1. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994) xvii. 
13 Philippe Le Billon, “The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed 
conflicts,” Political Geography 20 (2001): 568-569. 
14 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 21. 
15 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 1-4. 
    ARAS Vol.33 No. 2 December 2012 78
personal means.16 Antonio Giustozzi explains that a warlord is “primarily 
concerned with his own benefit and does not fight for a superior cause.”17 
In order to maintain their authoritative positions, rulers dissolve any 
institutions that could serve the public interest, under the belief that they 
may act as stepping stones for potential rivals or unruly citizens.18 Such 
states come to rely more heavily on patrimonial systems than weak states, 
as these help compensate for the lack of internal legitimacy.  
 
These patrimonial networks, however, are not limited to local capacity. 
An external dimension of elite accommodation allows warlord states to 
maintain a semblance of international sovereignty while by-passing the 
liberalisation paradox associated with meeting weak state creditors’ 
demands for reform. Indeed, finance provided by foreign patronage often 
serves to maintain a ruler’s internal clientele network.19 Internal 
authoritative control is made possible by auctioning off state resources to 
external entities, which in turn provides funds that can be used to buy 
political and military legitimacy among a patrimonial network of elites. 
Robert Jackson uses the term ‘quasi-state’ to describe this combination of 
external dependency and internal institutional weakness.20 A quasi-state 
comes to rely upon foreign patronage systems, as these help compensate 
for the lack of bureaucratic institutions that result from the adoption of 
warlord strategies. The leaders of quasi-states are reliant upon the 
compensating effect of foreign entities to maintain their authoritative 
positions. These external forces are indeed central in ensuring the 
international recognition of a ruler’s sovereignty, regardless of local 
empirical reality.  
 
If networks of patronage extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
state itself, as is often the case with elite accommodation, we find 
ourselves in the realm of international relations. Within this discipline, 
the external and internal forces are traditionally regarded separately. 
However, Callaghy et al. argue for the introduction of the concept of 
                                                 
16 William Reno, “War, Markets, and Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States,” 
Comparative Politics 29:4 (1997): 493-510; William Reno, “The Politics of 
Insurgency in Collapsing States,” Development and Change 33:5 (2002): 837- 858. 
17 Antonio Giustozzi, The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military 
Legitimacy. Crisis States Discussion Paper, 13. (London: Crisis States Programme, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2005), 5. 
18 Chris Allen, “Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa,” Review of 
African Political Economy 81 1999): 367-384. 
19 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 2, 21, 30. 
20 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
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‘transboundary formations,’ wherein the external and internal are 
analysed in conjunction with each other.21 As the present analysis is 
concerned with the role external forces play within a local setting, it is 
useful here to deconstruct this concept.  
 
Transboundary Formations and Transterritorial Deployments 
The term transboundary formation (TF) signifies the intersection of state 
and non-state actors within the territorial boundaries of the state itself, 
employed to indicate the junctures of local (state) and external (non-state) 
forces.22  The adoption of the term transboundary formation is significant 
in that it encompasses the considerable diversity that accompanies 
instances of domestic intersection. Usage of this concept facilitates an 
understanding of how global, regional, national and local forces are 
linked through differentiating structures and networks. This connectivity, 
however, is not limited to a single capacity, such as a physical presence or 
trade resources. TFs exist within three specific dimensions: international 
arenas, translocal networks and transterritorial deployments.23 Broadly 
speaking, these dimensions can be seen as, or reflective of elements of 
globalisation theory, as they mirror the global/local interactions of TF.  
 
Arjun Appadurai’s text Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalisation breaks the theory of globalisation into five basic 
overlapping components: money, people, ideology, technology and 
media.24 We argue that instances of transboundary formation can result 
from any of these dimensions and may not be limited to a single 
component. Indeed, within globalisation theory, such global/local 
interactions can be derivatives of a combination of these antecedent 
components, for example, technology facilitates media coverage, which is 
further aided by transportation and this, in turn, relies on finance. 
Callaghy et al. arrive at a similar conclusion, highlighting the reciprocal 
                                                 
21 Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham, eds. Intervention and 
Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7. 
22 Robert Latham, “Identifying the contours of transboundary political life.” In 
Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power, eds. 
Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 84-85. 
23 Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa,” 145; Callaghy et al., Intervention 
and Transnationalism, ix; Latham, “Identifying the contours,” 71. 
24 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. 8th 
ed., (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 37; Appadurai employs the 
terms: financescape, ethnoscape, ideoscape, technoscape, and mediascape to classify 
these components.   
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flow of ideas often observed in domestic institutions engaging in 
translocal and transnational interactions.25 It is reasonable to conclude 
that transboundary formations are not limited to, nor exist solely within, 
any one component force, and thus act as examples of globalisation.  
 
Within transboundary formations, a distinction between judicial and non-
judicial intersections exists. We use the term ‘judicial’ to denote an 
institution’s existence as deriving from some form of legal expression, 
such as “a constitution or chapter that is accorded recognition by other 
institutions and groups operating as legal entities.”26 This distinction is 
critical for illuminating the complexities of order and authority that occur 
through global/local intersections. Categorising instances of 
transboundary formation as either judicial or non-judicial not only 
furthers understanding of how they differ from one another, but assists in 
the comprehension of their complex interactions. Although this article is 
focused on judicial forms of intersection, the actors who propagate them 
are often involved in a range of non-judicial, informal or illegal political 
and economic practices. In making this distinction here, we differentiate 
between the forces while allowing for the discussion of significant 
crossover in the following analysis.   
 
Within the scope of transboundary formation, Robert Latham’s concept 
of transterritorial deployment (TD) denotes the physical presence of an 
external force in a domestic setting.27 Although instances of TF can 
originate via several forces that have their inspiration in/from 
globalisation, TD explicitly implies a physical non-state presence within 
territorial borders.28 This stands in contrast to contemporary ideological 
or economic instances of transboundary formation, which often bypass 
the need for a physical presence; such as offshore banking and online 
communications.  This does not imply, however, that such forces will not 
result in an eventual physical presence, but rather that their intended 
purpose does not call for it. TD is unidirectional, in that the external force 
does not require a reciprocal physical presence. As such, it is distinct 
from mutual instances of deployment, such as student exchange. This 
form of transboundary formation only requires the external force to be 
                                                 
25 Callaghy et al., Intervention and Transnationalism, 17. 
26 Callaghy et al., Intervention and Transnationalism, 15. 
27 Latham, “Identifying the contours,” 71, 75. 
28 Ronald Kassimir, “If You Are Part of the Solution, You Are Likely Part of the 
Problem: Transboundary Formations and Africa.” In The Study of Africa: Global and 
Transnational Engagements, ed. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Oxford:African Books 
Collective, 2006), 45. 
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present within the territorial borders of the state. Latham, commenting on 
the origin of the deployment, elaborates upon unidirectional actors by 
stating that “the place from which they are deployed is typically some 
kind of organizational platform.”29 Transnational corporations and 
international agencies are prominent instigators of TD.30 For example, the 
Canada-based exploration and development company Castle Peak Mining 
Ltd. owns and works on eight gold mines and multiple development 
projects in Ghana.31 Similarly, the international non-profit organisation 
WaterAid works throughout 17 countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific 
region.32   
 
Similar to the judicial distinction highlighted in TF, both judicial and 
non-judicial forms of TD also exist. Latham highlights that non-judicial 
forms include “syndicates and trading diaspora conducting illegal 
commerce and rebel forces penetrating neighbouring territories.”33 
Similarly, judicial forms include “transnational corporations, 
development agencies, and peacekeeping troops.”34 Though judicial and 
non-judicial forms of TD share similarities, favoured structural and 
ideological characteristics often serve as markers for their differentiation. 
Indeed, a classification as judicial informs aspects of the structure and 
purpose of the organisational platform from which an intersection force is 
deployed. Identifying the legal disposition of an organisation can help us 
to understand its general characteristics. For example, an invading militia 
(non-judicial) will often employ a decentralised cell network, while 
stationed peacekeeping troops (judicial) will adhere to a hierarchical 
structure.35 Though both are examples of TD by non-state actors, the 
characteristics of their judicial/non-judicial form differentiates them.  
                                                 
29 Latham, “Identifying the contours,” 75. 
30 Latham, “Identifying the Contours,”; Yolande Miller-Grandvaux, Michel 
Welmond, and Joy Wolf, Evolving Partnerships: The Role of NGOs in Basic 
Education in Africa.(Washington: United States Agency for International 
Development, Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development, 2002). 
31 InfoMine Inc. Castle Peak Mining Ltd. Mining Company & Property Database, 
2011, http://www.infomine.com/index/companies/Castle_Peak_Mining_Ltd..html 
(accessed  4 September 2011). 
32 WaterAid. About Us: Organisation.  2011, http://www.wateraid.org/australia/about 
_us/organisation/default.asp (accessed  4 September 2011). 
33 Latham, “Identifying the contours,” 17. 
34 Latham, “Identifying the contours,” 17. 
35 Kevin. C. Leahy, The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and 
Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups, A thesis presented to the Faculty of the 
US Army Command and General Staff College. Scranton, University of Scranton. 
Master of Military Art and Science, 2005, available at www.dtic.mil/dtic 
/tr/fulltext/u2/a437024.pdf (accessed 15 August 2012), 74. 
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If we consider instances of transboundary formations to occur in fact, 
then we are left to contemplate the reasons behind their occurrence. Why 
do weak African states engage with and allow external forces to hold 
such levels of authority within their territorial borders? Certainly one 
such interaction pivotal in the development of transboundary formations 
is Jean-Francois Bayart’s concept of ‘extraversion’ strategies, which 
sheds light on how warlord states maintain sovereignty.36 To compensate 
for the internal weakness of their state, rulers develop relationships with 
external entities such as non-African states, transnational corporations 
and international organisations. As Callaghy et al. explain, individual 
states utilise extraversion strategies for a plethora of reasons.37 States 
such as Mozambique and Uganda draw upon them to stabilise and, in 
some instances, strengthen their position after significant decline. Nigeria 
and Kenya have employed strategies of extraversion to alleviate pressure 
from challenges instigated by non-state transboundary formations. 
Finally, states such as the DRC, Chad and Sierra Leone have used such 
strategies to manage decline “while attempting to carve out new orders 
that might benefit those who control the increasingly hollow state.”38 This 
concept can be seen as an extension of Bayart’s own notion of elite 
accommodation—that strategies of extraversion expand the concept of 
regional patronage systems to include foreign investors.39 As a foreign 
patrimonial system, it affords external entities similar benefits to those 
experienced by internal elites. This is significant in that it demonstrates 
the capacity of external entities to inhabit political positions that run 
parallel to those of local strongmen, positions which the state then comes 
to rely upon to maintain sovereignty.   
 
Sovereignty 
Thomson has observed that international relations and politics are 
conducted within a network of sovereign governments.40 Without the 
recognition of state autonomy, ethically sound relations—political or 
economic—cannot transpire on the global stage. It has even been 
suggested that sovereignty lubricates the machinery of international 
relations.41 Chazan et al. consider sovereignty to be the recognition of 
                                                 
36 Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. (New York: 
Longman Publishing, 1993), 218. 
37 Callaghy et al., Intervention and Transnationalism,12, 14.  
38 Callaghy et al., Intervention and Transnationalism, 12. 
39 Bayart, L'etat en Afrique: Politique du Ventre, 150ff. 
40 Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics., 3rd ed., (London and New 
York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 155. 
41 John Hoffman, Sovereignty. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998). 
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international legitimacy; indeed this is the most commonly held 
definition.42 Drawing upon the notion that sovereignty is the claim of 
supreme political authority within territorial borders, it stands to reason 
that the act of engaging in international relations reinforces political 
autonomy to non-state entities. This is often regardless of localised 
perceptions of the controlling power’s legitimacy and the empirical 
reality of its ability to fully enact sovereign rule.43 Sovereignty, in this 
context, is a mutually beneficial construct in that it allows states to 
engage in reciprocal recognition. To cite Thomson’s example, state A’s 
recognition of state B’s sovereign status usually implies a shared 
recognition of A’s own sovereign status.44 Thus, substantive relations 
conducted within legitimate global networks allow for the reciprocal 
recognition of states’ autonomous status. Recognition of complete 
authority is further strengthened by the presence of an international 
system advocating ‘non-interference’ in the territorial jurisdiction of other 
states. Sovereign status, in this regard, implies complete political and 
military authority within the territorial borders of a state, free from the 
interference of similarly recognised states.45 Reno, following Jackson, 
argues that rulers of quasi-states do not possess sovereignty via internal 
legitimacy, but rather through a “... globally recognised people’s right to a 
particular territory.”46  
 
Interestingly, quasi-states do not meet the theoretical requirements for 
legitimate sovereignty. The ability of a quasi-state to maintain control 
relies significantly on the backing of external investors to compensate for 
institutional weakness. In the present argument, rulers of warlord states 
have been characterised within this article as agents of bureaucratic 
extirpation.47 Neopatrimonialism fills the void left in the wake of warlord 
                                                 
42 Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, Stephen John 
Stedman, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999), 30. 
43 David W. Potter, State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States, in 
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference. 2004: University of Adelaide. 
44 Thomson, An Introduction, 155. 
45 Conversely, following the Cold War the respect for non-interference has diminished 
somewhat. Citing humanitarian intervention and ‘the fight against terrorism,’ major 
Western powers have been viewed as infringing upon the sovereignty of smaller 
states.   
46 Jackson, Quasi-states; Reno, Warlord Politics, 18. 
47 Antonio Giustozzi, The Debate on Wardlordism, 1; Jeremy I. Levitt, “Illegal 
Peace?: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power-Sharing with Warlords and Rebels in 
Africa,” Michigan Journal of International Law 27(2006):495-577; Kimberly 
    ARAS Vol.33 No. 2 December 2012 84
politics, compensating for the structural insufficiencies of bureaucratic 
dissolution. Yet, as we argue here, the instances of bureaucratic and 
military replacement created by TD are merely by-products of the 
presence of an external force. They do not represent a persistent and 
reliable structure, let alone a basis for the development of the working 
class. Sovereignty derives from the recognition (domestic and/or 
international) of the legitimate use of force. The process of foreign actors 
propping up quasi-states, and enacting varying levels of political 
influence, serves to contradict claims of autonomy. Moreover, as 
political, economic and social activity within the quasi-state’s jurisdiction 
is traditionally centralised in an attempt to monopolise power, state 
influence will disperse the further one travels from the central city or 
economic asset.48 In instances where autonomy is localised, the ruler has 
a diminished capacity to enact political control throughout territorial 
borders. External forces however, are may still be willing to recognise 
that state’s sovereignty. This notion of reciprocal benefit is central to our 
argument here: in order to maintain sovereignty, rulers of warlord states 
come to rely on judicial forms of TD. 
 
Maintaining Sovereignty through Transterritorial Deployments 
Rulers of warlord states reject the pursuit of the collective good, which 
they view as providing resources to potential rivals. Indeed, this is the 
primary reason that such rulers abjure the creation of institutions that are 
“capable of developing independent perspectives.”49 They fear that such 
institutions will act on interests that run counter to their own. Dissolving 
bureaucratic institutions provides a barrier to localised economic 
development, which could be used against the ruler. This termination of 
state infrastructure, however, isolates the ruler from the local population, 
which fails to receive vital state support.50 The resulting deficiency of 
internal legitimacy is a significant contributing factor in the mobilisation 
of popular support to challenge strongmen. To compensate, rulers place 
increasing levels of reliance on internal patrimonial networks. These 
networks allow the ruler to buy the loyalty of individuals in positions of 
power. In many cases, these patrimonial systems stem the tide of internal 
resistance. Consider the emphasis of Liberia’s Samuel Doe on 
accommodating the elite following the violent overthrow of President 
                                                                                                                                            
Marten,“Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,”International Security, 31:3 
(2006/07): 41-73. 
48 Thomson, An Introduction, 5. 
49 Reno, Warlord Politics, 1. 
50 Zartman, Collapsed States, 10. 
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William Tolbert.51 Doe successfully co-opted and balanced different 
political factions and created a patrimonial system within the state, 
allowing for a monopolisation of the distribution of state resources.52 A 
reliance on neopatrimonialism, however, can also have the undesired 
effect of further isolating the ruler from ordinary citizens, as they come to 
realise that the weakness of their state derives from their ruler’s 
accommodation of the elite. Nevertheless, these patrimonial systems are 
crucial in maintaining political and military control within territorial 
borders.  
 
As warlord states lack bureaucratic institutions, and thus vehicles for 
legitimate economic development, patrimonial systems are kept afloat via 
wealth derived from foreign investors; accessed through the enactment of 
strategies of extraversion. This non-state wealth is critical to the 
maintenance of state sovereignty. Laurent Kabila’s march to power over 
Mobutu in 1997 within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
highlights the significance of external wealth in establishing authoritative 
power.53 As Callaghy et al. have explained, “[i]n order to finance the 
ongoing uprising, Kabila, as the presumptive new leader of the country, 
hurriedly made deals with an assortment of international mining 
companies and other firms.”54 Kabila continued to make these deals, all 
the while stopping the UN and most non-government organisations from 
operating within the newly baptised DRC, in a blatant rejection of the 
UN’s liberalist ideology. Indeed, Reno suggests that Kabila’s 
construction of authority took inspiration from Mobutu’s own system of 
resource control.55 Kabila recognised the value of the state’s natural 
resources, and welcomed foreign firms to invest in them providing they 
paid a war tax of 15% of the projected investment.56 When American 
Mineral Fields (AMF) signed a billion-dollar deal with Kabila in 1997, in 
addition to providing his regime with a healthy financial boost it helped 
                                                 
51 William Reno, “Reinvention of an African patrimonial state: Charles Taylor's 
Liberia,” Third World Quarterly 16:1 (1995): 109-120. 
52 Yekutiel Gershoni, “War without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone,” African Studies Review 40:3 (1997): 55-76. 
53 Jeffrey Herbst, “Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice.” In When 
States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ:Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 306-308; Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila,” African Affairs 100:399 (2001): 311-317. 
54 Callaghy et al., Intervention and Transnationalism, 2. 
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to legitimise his authoritative position to outsiders.57 The deal was 
significant in establishing his credibility with other external investors, as 
it displayed his willingness to participate in global markets. The 
subsequent judicial TD served as a form of reciprocal recognition. In 
establishing himself as an authoritative leader—one who controlled the 
state’s resources and enacted a significant level of military control—the 
investment on behalf of the AMF served to reinforce to non-state entities 
Kabila’s rule.58 In this instance, investors accepted warlord tactics as long 
as the maintenance of Kabila’s sovereignty continued to meet their 
interests.  
 
The role of wealth deriving from transboundary formations in 
maintaining sovereignty is not limited to reciprocal recognition (Kabila) 
or the maintenance of patrimonial networks (Doe). Wealth also plays an 
important factor in maintaining military control over a state’s resources, 
which rulers can then auction off to achieve global recognition of their 
state’s sovereignty. In 1994, the civil war in Sierra Leone took a dramatic 
shift when the country’s diamond, titanium oxide and bauxite mines were 
captured by local rebels. Responding to this critical situation and the 
impending attack on the capital Freetown, the ruler Valentine Strasser 
contracted a number of external military organisations to provide 
assistance. One such force was the Gurkha Security Guards (GSG), which 
was hired to train the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). 
The GSG, however, soon came under pressure to directly engage the 
rebels. Refusing to do so, it became apparent that the RSLMF, regardless 
of its training, would be unable to recapture the resources of the state 
without additional help.59  
 
Following the refusal of the GSG in Sierra Leone, Strasser’s regime faced 
widespread warlord competition.60 Lacking the adequate military force to 
otherwise legitimise his local position, he contracted the non-state 
mercenary organisation Executive Outcomes to clear the country’s 
                                                 
57 David Barouski, Mining in the Ituri Province of the Congo: A Contemporary 
Profile,  2009, www.zcommunications.org/mining-in-the-ituri-province-of-the-congo-
a-contemporary-profile-by-david-barouski (accessed 5 September 2011). 
58 Jeffrey Herbst, “Let them Fail,” 2004, 302-303; Reno, Warlord Politics, 174-175. 
59 Alex Vines, “Gurkhas and the private security business in Africa.” in Peace, Profit 
or Plunder? The privatisation of security in war-torn African societies, eds. Jakkie 
Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), 123. 
60 Vines, “Gurkhas,” 129-132. 
                                   ARAS Vol.33 No.2 December 2012  87
resource areas of their current occupants.61 The firm was effective in 
eliminating rebel opposition within the state itself, denying warlord 
competitors the potential springboard from which to usurp Strasser’s 
position.62 Collaborating with Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, Strasser’s 
second in command, they managed to clear the capital area of rebels in 
one week and reconquer the diamond mining areas shortly thereafter.63 
Strasser’s regime, however, had very little money to pay for the military 
services provided by Executive Outcomes: “at first, with about 200 
employees, Executive Outcomes’ services cost several million dollars a 
month.”64 Drawing upon his state’s reinvigorated sovereign status, 
Strasser mortgaged off the state’s natural resource areas to foreign firms 
which, thanks to Executive Outcomes, were now free of their previous 
occupants. In addition financial payment, Executive Outcomes was 
allowed to organise favoured commercial firms to set up businesses in the 
territories to exploit natural resources.65 The most significant of these is 
the British mining company Branch Energy, which is partly owned by 
Strategic Resources of Pretoria, the holding company of Executive 
Outcomes. In this way, Strasser’s sovereign status facilitated the hiring of 
EO, which, at the same time, helped reinforce the status itself. Stability, 
and thus recognition of sovereignty, was a result of the presence of 
Executive Outcome. By securing the state’s resources, the firm paved the 
way for its larger investing company, Branch Energy, to develop legal 
infrastructure within the state itself. The wealth that resulted from 
contracted judicial TDs, such as that of Branch Energy, allowed Strasser 
to maintain his local authoritative position and, ultimately, his political 
autonomy.   
 
Transterritorial deployments also serve a pivotal role in maintaining 
sovereignty within warlord states by placing external actors in positions 
of state power. Indeed, the presence of Executive Outcomes was of 
paramount importance to Strasser’s continued sovereignty in Sierra 
Leone.66 The militia organisation occupied the role of the state’s primary 
military power, eradicating the rebel forces that had previously plagued 
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the state. With EO’s direct participation and collaboration, Strasser was 
able to maintain political and military control over the state and its 
resources, thereby achieving a level of sovereignty that was recognised 
internationally. The hiring of Executive Outcomes, however, had an 
added benefit. The presence of the militia firm allowed Strasser’s regime 
to reduce its reliance on the “underpaid rank-and-file military, which had 
a tendency to spawn ‘sobels,’ or soldier-rebels who looted and engaged in 
clandestine mining like their erstwhile rebel enemies.”67  
 
Strasser’s favouring of external actors for positions of state power was 
also demonstrated in his contracting of GSG to train Sierra Leonean 
troops prior to the involvement of Executive Outcomes. Here, Robert 
Mackenzie, an American professional soldier, served as GSG’s Sierra 
Leone commander.68 As a hired external force, Mackenzie posed less of a 
threat to Strasser’s authority than a local strongman delegated the same 
level of command. Placing internal actors in positions of power creates 
opportunities for localised conflict, for example, in the form of insurgent 
movements. Conversely, external judicial actors represent far less of a 
threat to the maintenance of authority as they lack the patrimonial 
networks that facilitate strongman power. In some cases, transnational 
corporations engaging in TD enact a level of independence in providing 
their own military protection. Not willing to rely on the state military, 
they employ local strongmen and/or external militia firms to compensate 
for the lack of state infrastructure.69  
 
Indeed, the level of support these deployments bring with them is 
sometimes enough to balance out the degrading effects warlord strategies 
have on the local population. If nothing else, they provide an ad hoc 
military defence from local rebel movements looking to acquire valuable 
state resources. Interestingly, because such quasi-states rely so heavily on 
foreign patrimonial networks to support their regimes, they do not 
technically qualify for sovereign status. Considering that sovereignty is 
the recognition of significant political and military control within 
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territorial borders, the infrastructure supplied by external forces merely 
provides a facade of stability. True stability should derive from internal 
infrastructure developed by the state, rather than a proverbial ‘bandaid’ 
which only remains in place as long as the state itself has something to 
offer. External forces can assume positions of power within a state, 
however they do not contribute to an empirical status of sovereignty. The 
bureaucratic structures developed by external forces are merely factors 
resulting from the firm’s continued presence. Once you remove the 
external force, you effectively remove the state stability.    
 
In terms of external actors occupying positions of state power, this is not 
restricted to the provision of a military presence. In some instances, TDs 
inhabit political positions beyond roles in state security, thereby 
contributing to a continued perception of sovereignty. One obvious 
example is where foreign patrimonial networks provide opportunities for 
exercising diplomatic relations with other outsiders. The involvement of 
AMF in the DRC is an excellent example of this. As discussed earlier, 
during 1997 Kabila’s rebel forces acted to systematically dissolve the 
control of Mobutu over the former Zaire.  As Kabila gained control over 
state resources, he auctioned them off to foreign firms, providing his war 
effort not only with a critical financial boost but also international 
recognition of his growing political control. However, the most 
significant factor was AMF’s billion-dollar deal, which provided cash and 
a jet to transport associates of the rebel leader. In addition to gaining 
access to secured state resources, AMF obtained rights to buy diamonds 
in Kisangani, “a trade that totalled $100,000 daily after rebels captured 
the city.”70 Though a calculated risk, the involvement of AMF in Kabila’s 
war efforts helped legitimise his political authority internationally. Prior 
to this, even Anglo American, an established former partner, had been 
hesitant to conduct deals with the perceived illegitimate rebel regime. 
Reno suggests that this derived from a fear of unsettling rulers of other 
weak states in which it had investments.71 AMF’s initial involvement, 
however, served to reassure other international firms of Kabila’s 
legitimacy. In this sense, the physical presence of AMF in the DRC 
served as a node for conducting international trade. Although external 
actors can be seen to play a noteworthy role in the legitimisation of state 
sovereignty, the recognition of a ruler’s ability to maintain an internal 
sense of legitimacy is an important factor in the development of these 
international trade networks.  
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An example of the significance of sovereignty in constructing 
international trade and other foreign patronage networks is the actions of 
Charles Taylor in Liberia in 1989. On Christmas Eve, Taylor’s dramatic 
appearance at the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia acted as 
a catalyst that dissolved the authoritative position of Samuel Doe as ruler 
of Liberia.72 In capturing Doe’s commercial networks, Taylor effectively 
crippled Doe’s dual patronage system which had previously allowed him 
to maintain political and military control. Taylor was set to create his own 
patronage network using local resources, thereby solidifying his position 
as the head of a sovereign state. As he marched towards Monrovia, the 
state’s capital city, he was blocked by a 12,000-strong intervention 
force.73 Known as the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and comprised mainly of Nigerian 
soldiers, the military intervention prohibited Taylor from entering the 
capital city. This effectively split Liberia into two sections: one controlled 
by Taylor (known as Taylorland), and the other comprised of ECOMOG 
and remnants of Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).74  
 
While Doe still held the capital and its port, Taylor was in possession of a 
significant portion of the state’s resources, a noteworthy contributing 
factor to Doe’s patronage system. However, the intervention of 
ECOMOG prevented Taylor from claiming sovereignty as he did not 
display significant political authority within Liberia’s territorial borders. 
This lack of sovereign status meant he was unable to “... sell diplomatic 
support in exchange for aid or politically motivated foreign investment as 
Doe had done.”75 Unconvincing in his claims to support state liberalist 
reform efforts, such as the holding of elections in the state’s capital, 
Taylor’s organisation could not attract large-scale overseas aid to 
counterbalance local strongmen. Taylor’s only option, in this sense, was 
to incorporate as many foreign commercial networks as he could in order 
to support his own military force. Regardless, the denial of state 
sovereignty was a crippling blow to Taylor’s bid for an authoritative 
position, as it ultimately rendered him unable to manipulate the privileges 
associated with state sovereignty and therefore push into the state’s 
capital. While this example highlights the importance of foreign 
patronage, particularly with regard to solidifying the global legitimacy of 
the ruler, it also demonstrates the role of TDs in denying resources to 
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rivals. The intervention of Nigeria in Liberia makes an interesting case 
for how state regional capacity influences sovereignty.  
 
The denial of state resources to potential rivals is an effective means of 
enforcing autonomy in a warlord state. Throughout the present 
discussion, rulers of warlord states have been characterised as primarily 
invested in the accumulation of personal wealth and power. They reject 
all notions of creating bureaucratic infrastructure under the belief that 
such institutions may develop philosophies that differ from their own and 
potentially act independently, providing a launch pad from which to usurp 
power. Reno has stated, “[e]conomic development is abjured when it 
threatens to put resources into the hands of those who might use them to 
challenge the rulers’ position.”76  
 
In May 1997, Kabila employed similar denial tactics in his attempt to rein 
in regional autonomy within the Kasai-Oriental province. Kasai-Oriental, 
specifically its provincial capital Mbuji-Mayi, had long been the centre 
for autonomous development efforts.77 In addition to establishing a 
university funded by the state-run mining company Societé Minière de 
Bakwanga (MIBA), it used the nearby Lubilanji hydro station to generate 
electricity, compensating for the state’s failure to provide suitable 
infrastructure.78 In an attempt to block further attempts at autonomy, 
Kabila moved to disrupt a proposed infrastructure deal with South 
African engineering firm Swanepoel to create a local railroad. The 
proposed infrastructure was contracted by the Conference for the 
Development of Kasai Oriental (CODEKOR), a collaboration of local 
officials and businesses intent on taking steps toward institutionalised 
autonomy. In an example of a separatist attempt to form a patrimonial 
network, “Swanepoel appointed a member of its firm to the board of 
CODEKOR,” effectively solidifying the political-private commercial 
nature of Kasai.79 These displays of autonomy represented a significant 
threat to the complete political control of Kabila’s regime. Backed by 
transterritorial networks of wealth, Kabila tightened his control over the 
area and, in doing so, furthered his own sovereign status. Denial tactics, 
however, are not confined to the wholesale dissolution of economic 
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footholds; a reliance on foreign patronage is also a useful method adopted 
by rulers to deny resources to potential rivals.   
 
Using foreign patronage as a denial tactic, rulers contract the exploitation 
of the state’s natural resources solely to overseas firms. The resulting 
wealth stays within a network of elites and out of the hands of threatening 
rebels and strongmen. Much of this wealth is often reinvested into local 
patrimonial networks in order to buy political resources, such as the 
procurement of loyalty from prominent individuals, and to secure 
weapons to strengthen the military position of the ruler. The early 
inability of Samuel Doe to control the state’s established elite network 
upon assuming power in 1980 is an excellent example of how control 
over state resources is critical. While Doe was later able to maintain 
control throughout these elite networks, his ability to do so derived not 
from his domination of state resources, but rather through a reliance on 
politically loyal foreign investors, multilateral creditors and U.S. aid.80 
The existence of TDs in the form of non-state firms allowed Doe to 
maintain a semblance of sovereignty within the complex network of 
established elites. Mobutu, however, recruited judicial forms of TD to 
deny resources in a much more obvious manner. In control of significant 
portions of Zaire’s resources, Mobutu auctioned them off to foreign 
investors to support his authoritative position.81 This allowed him to 
compensate for the state’s lack of bureaucratic institutions whilst denying 
economic resources to potential rivals. The money deriving from the 
external forces went directly into purchasing political loyalty or resources 
within his network of supporters.82 This prevented any autonomous 
economic development from which a counter-movement could develop. 
In short, the physical presence of foreign entities within the state allowed 
Mobutu to procure wealth without having to rely on bureaucratic 
institutions that posed potential threats. This wealth was used to secure 
political power, reiterating his sovereign status.  
 
Conclusion 
Warlord states and their rulers can be characterised by an almost 
complete disregard for the collective interest. Rulers of weak states, 
regardless of their failure to meet the basic needs of the population, still 
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assume their roles under the pretence of acting for the collective good: the 
betterment of the state and its people. Conversely, rulers of warlord states 
manipulate the composition of the state to benefit their own ability to 
maintain power and wealth. This is demonstrated by their actions to 
completely dissolve state bureaucracies and a tendency to rely on forms 
of neopatrimonialism.   
 
Similarly, quasi-states can be defined by the over reliance of a state on 
external patronage and support to compensate for its own structural 
insufficiencies. Within these states, rulers privatise natural resources to 
maintain their sovereign status. Relevant to this is the presence of 
transboundary formations, the intersection of local and external forces 
deriving from one of several sources inspired by globalisation. A subset 
of these formations, transterritorial deployments (TDs), denote the 
physical presence of an external force in a domestic setting. In the present 
argument, we have characterised the domestic setting as strictly African, 
and the converging external force as predominantly non-African. 
 
In order to maintain sovereignty, rulers of warlord states capitalise upon 
the physical presence of non-state entities through a combination of three 
processes. First, they auction off state resources to procure wealth, 
enabling them to purchase political power within the state and maintain a 
patrimonial network to support the regime. Instances of TD serve as 
markers for other external firms concerned with state stability. In this 
capacity, the physical presence of an external force contributes to 
international recognition of the rulers’ legitimacy. Second, rulers employ 
non-state actors to fill positions of political and military power to 
compensate for the state’s lack of bureaucratic infrastructure. 
Transterritorial actors in such positions pose significantly less of a threat 
to state authority than local strongmen. These positions also contribute to 
a facade of stability in areas displaying structural weakness. Last, the 
foreign patrimonial networks deriving from TD ensure that wealth and 
natural resources are kept out of the hands of individuals who would 
utilise them to challenge the ruler’s sovereign position. Moreover, the 
backing of these networks allows for the dissolution of any infrastructure 
resulting from separatist economic development.  
 
Instances of TD constitute but one facet of the ability of warlord states to 
maintain sovereignty. They are significant, however, in that they 
legitimise a ruler’s authority regardless of their having complete 
empirical control over the state. Analysis of their influence facilitates a 
greater understanding of the contribution of external forces in warlord 
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states. Further research is required to investigate the role of regional 
actors in the maintenance of state sovereignty, and to examine non-
judicial forms of TD—a noteworthy contributing force not discussed 
here. In a broader sense, TDs comprise but one element of transboundary 
formations. Analyses of their variant forms in relation to warlord states 
would provide important insight into local/global interactions and the 
manner in which they affect perceptions of sovereignty, and contribute to 
current understanding with regard to how external entities shape forms of 
authority and governance. Such understanding would inform the critical 
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